Buddhist scholar and author John Peacocke talks with Tricyle about what we can learn by taking a close look at the language and philosophies of the Buddha’s time.
The teachings of the Buddha have been variously understood by
scholars, monks, and laypeople over the centuries. But what was it that
the Buddha actually taught? While this remains an open and oft-debated
question, scholar John Peacocke—in his work as both an academic and a
dharma teacher—asserts that by looking to the history, language, and
rich philosophical environment of the Buddha’s day we can uncover what
is most distinctive and revolutionary about his teachings. Peacocke,
who does not shy away from controversy, argues that in some very
important ways, later Buddhist schools depart from early core
teachings.
Peacocke has been practicing Buddhism since 1970. He was
first exposed to Buddhism at monasteries in South India, where he
ordained as a monk in the Tibetan tradition. He later studied in Sri
Lanka, where Theravada Buddhism has flourished for centuries. Returning
to lay life and his native England, Peacocke went on to receive his
Ph.D. in Buddhist studies at the University of Warwick. He currently
lectures on Buddhist and Hindu thought at the University of Bristol and
next year will begin teaching at the Mindfulness-based Cognitive
Therapy Master of Studies program at Oxford University. A former
director of the Sharpham Centre for Buddhist Studies in Devon, England,
Peacocke also serves on the teaching council at nearby Gaia House, a
retreat center offering instruction in a variety of Buddhist
traditions. He now teaches and practices in the Vipassana tradition.
Tricycle editor James Shaheen visited with Peacocke near
Bristol University in April to discuss what the language of the early
Pali and Sanskrit texts tells us about Buddhism today.

© David Crowley
To what sort of world was the Buddha introducing his teachings?
Fifth-century BCE India witnessed a philosophically rich period,
and a time of social, political, and cultural upheaval. It is during
this period that we see the transition from tribal republics (ganasanghas) to a centralized power structure presided over by a monarch. The Buddha’s teaching—for example, in the Mahaparanibbana Sutta—is
situated within just such a context. At the opening of the sutta we see
an emissary of King Ajatasattu, the king of Magadha, attempting to
obtain information from the Buddha in order to vanquish the Vajjian
federation. Even the Sakyas (the Buddha’s tribe) were not immune from
such territorial aggrandizement; they were defeated by the son of King
Pasenadi during the Buddha’s own lifetime. There were also many
competing religious traditions at the time, and in the early Pali
canon, in the Long Discourses of the Buddha (Brahmajala Sutta),
we find descriptions of sixty-two types of philosophies. These are
considered by the Buddha to be sixty-two instances of wrong view.
That’s the world of ideas the Buddha is responding to.
What were the dominant beliefs of the time?
The Buddha was responding to two primary strands of thought. You
have to bear in mind, though, that there was no such thing as Hinduism
as we know it today. Rather, you had the dominant Brahmanical culture—
Brahmanism—which was primarily a sacrificial religion, along with the
breakaway Upanishadic culture that arose out of it and was eventually
reincorporated into the Brahmanical worldview, and you had ascetic
Jainism.
Can you say something first about Brahmanism?
Brahmanism dealt primarily with propitiating the gods, who were
believed to maintain the cosmic order. Everything was believed to be
ordered and regulated and it was through sacrifices to the gods that
this order was maintained. Through meticulously executed ritual, the
Brahmans induced the gods to do everything from ensuring predictable
planetary orbits and regular seasons to sustaining the strictly
hierarchical social order characteristic of the time. The three classes
of Veda (Rig, Sama, and Yajur), which served as the
Brahmanical culture’s literary base, are essentially instructions for
properly performing rituals that will perpetuate what was thought to be
the natural order of things. The defining concept of the Vedas is the
notion of cosmic order, rita. So Buddhist thought is in part a
reaction to a purely sacrificial and highly ritualistic culture. In the
early canon you often find critical mention of ritual.
Can you give an example?
A number of examples are scattered throughout the Pali Canon. In the Kutadanta Sutta,
the Buddha subverts the notion of literal animal sacrifice by claiming
that true sacrifice is the performance of generosity, taking refuge or
adhering to the five precepts. In another instance, in the Sigalaka Sutta,
the Buddha comes across a young Brahmin named Sigalaka ritualistically
paying homage to the six directions as a way of expressing honor,
sacredness, and reverence. During the discourse the Buddha, as in the
previous example, gets the Brahmin to see that the true way to express
these things is through adherence to the precepts and generally
behaving in an ethical manner. The Buddha in both cases reveals his
practical bias. He does not concern himself with what he considers
empty and pointless ritual. And he demonstrates his rhetorical
brilliance by using the very customs and language of the dominant
culture he critiques to subvert it.
Can you give an example of how he does that?
There’s hardly a term the Buddha uses that’s not actually
derived from a pre-Buddhist context. The Buddha literally takes the
religious language of the Brahmins and the Jains and deconstructs and
redefines it for his own purposes. Basically, he’s hijacking the
language and customs of the dominant religions—whether that of the
ascetic Jains, the ritualistic Brahmins, or the philosophers and
mystics of the Upanishads—to introduce an entirely new body of ideas.
Take, for instance, the three ritual household fires of the Indian
home. In Buddhism, they are no longer the sacred fires one must keep
continuously lit in order to maintain cosmic and social order; rather,
they become the fires of anger, greed, and delusion—the “three poisons”
we are enjoined to extinguish. Upadana, or the “fuel” used to keep the fires burning, becomes in Buddhism the stuff that fuels samsara, the world of suffering, that is, “attachment” or “clinging.”
So his method was to critique the existing culture of the time by turning the language of that culture on itself?
That’s exactly right. He very cleverly hijacks virtually all of
their language —and not just that of the Brahmanical culture but also
that of the Jains. For example, take a term like asava. For the
Jains the term means “influx” and refers to that which weighs down the
soul and keeps it bound to the cycle of rebirth. However, for the
Buddha the term has the connotation of something that flows out of us,
namely, ignorance, sensual desire, and craving for continued existence.
It is these things, from the Buddha’s point of view, that keep the
individual bound to samsara.
According to the British scholar Richard Gombrich, the Buddhist Middle
Way is in fact the middle way between highly materialistic Brahmanism
and excessively ascetic Jainism. It’s not just asceticism in general
that the Buddha is reacting to, it’s the extreme asceticism primarily
associated with the Jains; and likewise, the household life and the
strict and materialistic rituals of the Brahmins. Somewhere in between
the two lies the Middle Way of the Buddha’s teachings.
What Brahmanism and the Upanishads had in common with Jainism
was a belief in an eternal soul, while the Buddha’s universal tenets of
anatta and anicca —“not-self” and “impermanence”—are a radical
rejection of this belief. Can you say something about this?
All three of those Indian traditions speak of an unchanging self
or soul. The Buddha’s teaching is highly radical in its break with
essentialist thinking, which usually conceives of the “real” as that
which does not change. The Buddha’s view was that absolutely everything
was changing and therefore the self was not exempt. As a result,
Buddhist thinking conceives of the self as process rather than as a
fixed an immutable essence.
How, then, would you look at the Brahmanical goal or the Upanishadic goal of religious activity versus the Buddhist goal?
The goal of Buddhist practice can be seen as radically different
from that of Brahmanical or Upanishadic thought. Brahmanical thought
had an excessive emphasis on ritualism and hierarchy focused on the
maintenance of order both human and divine. And the Upanishads
concentrated on the realization of the lack of differentiation between brahman and atman—the essence of all things and the individual self.
The Buddha is not looking outside of ourselves for anything, for any supports. In the Mahaparinibbana Sutta
he instructs us to be lamps unto ourselves and insists that everything
we need to know can be found within “this fathom-long carcass.” This
latter suggestion is the Buddha once again alluding to Brahmanical
beliefs, one in which the entire cosmos, and everything contained
within it, is represented in the form of the male body. In fact, this
could be seen as a direct reference to the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad,
where it is claimed that in the beginning the whole world was the self
in the shape of a person. However, the Buddha is really not looking to
external elements, whether metaphysical or sacrificial, as a way of
life. His primary focus is on our internal experience and ethical
activity. This is a real break from Brahmanical culture.
Brahmanical culture did not have an ethical focus?
The focus for Brahmanical culture was duty, and again, the
proper performance of ritual. The Buddha’s focus was volition,
intentional motivation. Everything hangs on motivation and
understanding as clearly as possible the individual’s own motivation
underlying all action. For the Brahmin, karma was created by how one
performed one’s duties and executed ritual; for the Buddha, intention
drove karma. The Brahmins never take the step into ethics that the
Buddha did.
While Brahmanical culture exhibited a literalist bent—ritual
had to be executed just to fuel nature’s processes both above and
below—in the thought of the Upanishads we find a philosophy that is as
sophisticated as any. What would be a fundamental distinction between
it and the Buddha’s method of inquiry at the time?
I distinguish the two traditions by the way they ask a question.
One way is metaphysical, which is precisely what the Buddha rejects: It
is to ask what something is. Running throughout the Upanishads is the
question, What is the self? And what is the true nature of that self?
And you basically end up with an essentialist answer to that question:
Atman is the universally abiding and unchanging self that underlies and
sustains all things; atman is the real self.


